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Abstract
This paper formulates the combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal control problem (DUESC) as a bi-level op-
timization problem. The signal control operator in the upper level optimizes the signal setting to minimize the system
travel time whereas the road users in the lower level minimize their own costs (by changing departure times, paths or
both) leading to dynamic user equilibrium behavior. Three components of the bi-level formulation are discussed in-
cluding network loading model, the dynamic user equilibrium model and the signal control model. Then the combined
problems are formulated as a Nash-Cournot game and a Stackelberg game. A solution technique based on the iterative
optimization and assignment (IOA) method is proposed to solve the DUESC problem. We use the projection algorithm
to solve the lower level and the mixed integer programming solver to solve the upper level. Extensive numerical results
demonstrate the beneﬁts of using this model.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Delft University
of Technology
Keywords: Dynamic user equilibrium, signal control optimization, Nash-Cournot game, Stackelberg game, mixed
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1. Introduction and motivation
Optimizing traﬃc signal setting accounting for the route choice behavior of road users has interested
researchers and practitioners for a long time. The problem is commonly known as the combined traﬃc
assignment and control problem. In literature, the signal setting is usually optimized assuming a ﬁxed route
choice behavior of road users while the traﬃc assignment problem is solved with a ﬁxed traﬃc signal setting.
Clearly, the signal setting inﬂuences the route/departure time choices of road users and the new ﬂow pattern
aﬀects the signal setting as well. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the interaction between signal setting
and route/departure time choice behavior of the road users. The objective of this paper is to formulate
and solve the combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal control (DUESC) as a bi-level optimization
problem.
For almost forty years, the research community has conducted many studies to gain insights into this
complex problem. Allsop (1974), and Allsop and Charlesworth (1977) were among the ﬁrst studies that
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addressed the eﬀect of signal control on route choice behavior. The consequences for the traﬃc assignment
problem considering detailed junctions and traﬃc signal rules were investigated by Heydecker (1983). The
conditions to guarantee a good user equilibrium solution were discussed and tested for uncontrolled and
signalized intersections. Heydecker (1987) considered how uncertainty and variability aﬀected the system
delay in signalized network and concluded that small degrees of variability leaded to small losses in perfor-
mance. Iterative optimization and assignment (IOA) algorithm proposed by Allsop (1974) is one of the com-
monly used solution approaches in static context (Heydecker, 1983; Sheﬃ et al., 1983; Chen, 1989). Yang
and Yagar (1995) modeled the combined traﬃc assignment and signal control in saturated road networks
as bi-level problem and determined equilibrium link ﬂow and delay using the sensitivity analysis proposed
by Friesz et al. (1990). Meneguzzer (1995) applied diagonalization algorithm to solve the combined user
equilibrium and signal control problem and showed the consistency of user equilibrium and signal control
policy from numerical results. Lee (1998), and Lee and Machemehl (2005) proposed diﬀerent heuristics
(simulated annealing, genetic algorithms, local search and iterative optimization and assignment) to ﬁnd
the global solution of the combined user equilibrium and signal control problem and reported the conver-
gence patterns of these algorithms. Chiou (1999) used projection method for local search and a heuristic
approach for global search. They also developed a mixed search procedure. Many other works on traﬃc
assignment and signal control have been conducted. However, most of them are based on the static network
loading model that cannot capture the realistic traﬃc dynamics. Although those combined user equilibrium
and signal control problems can be used for the strategic and tactical planning problem when traﬃc ﬂow is
time-invariant, they are not appropriate for short-term operations when traﬃc ﬂow and network condition
vary over time.
Recent advances in dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) and dynamic signal control (DSC) models have
provided an impetus to model the combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal control (DUESC). The
formulations and solution methods for solving the DUE problems could be found in Friesz et al. (1993); Lo
and Szeto (2002); Szeto and Lo (2004); Ramadurai et al. (2010); Nie and Zhang (2010); Han et al. (2011);
Ukkusuri et al. (2012), etc. On the other hand, the signal control optimization problems were studied in
Lo (1999, 2001); Ceylan and Bell (2004); Beard and Ziliaskopoulos. (2006); Ukkusuri et al. (2010); Aziz
and Ukkusuri (2012), etc. These studies did an excellent job in modeling either DUE or DSO separately.
However, there are very few studies that consider the integrated DUESC model.
Formulating and solving the DUESC problem is challenging due to various reasons. First, the for-
mulation is bi-level in nature with non-convex constraints. In addition, the signal control formulation in-
volves integer variables that signiﬁcantly increases computational complexity. Moreover, it is challenging
to combine DUE and DSC models into a single framework due to the diﬀerence in network loading models.
Accordingly, only limited number of studies focuses on developing the DUESC formulation. Gartner and
Stamatiadis (1998) extended the static combined user equilibrium and signal control to the dynamic case
and provided a framework for the interaction between real-time adaptive DUE and DSC. Neither a speciﬁc
formulation nor algorithm was discussed in that research. Formulating DUE and DSC as two separate Varia-
tional Inequality (VI) problems before combining them into DUESC problems, Chen and Ben-akiva (1998)
solved three games (Cournot, Stackelberg, and Monopoly) between the traﬃc operator and road users. The
formulations were tested with a small network to demonstrate the superiority of Stackelberg solution over
Cournot solution while Monopoly solution served as a benchmark for the others. Ceylan and Bell (2004)
focused on using genetic algorithm (GA) to solve the integrated DUESC problem using simulation tool
TRANSYT. The results from GA were shown to be more eﬃcient than that from the IOA solution method.
Testing diﬀerent control strategies for several small networks, Taale and Van Zuylen (2003) found that the
anticipatory control was better than local control and ﬁxed time control strategies. In an attempt to solve the
games formulated with three players (urban road authority, motorway authority and road users), Van Zuylen
and Taale (2004) considered diﬀerent strategies for a small network. The authors concluded that the separate
or integrated control from two authorities obtained better system travel time. Sun et al. (2006) developed a
heuristic solution approach based on generic algorithm (GA). The cell transmission model (CTM) was used
to avoid the lack of analytical representation of traﬃc ﬂow and signal interaction. However, the solution
from GA might not be very stable under small perturbations which could signiﬁcantly change the responses
by road users and signal operator. Mitsakisa et al. (2011) reviewed the existing literature in DUESC before
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proposing a framework for DUESC with a claim that equilibrium condition could be obtained when the
iterative process converged. However, they did not provide either speciﬁc analytical formulation or algo-
rithm. The numerical experiments using VISTA were provided but very few insights are drawn from these
results. Karoonsoontawong and Waller (2009) and Karoonsoontawong and Waller (2010) developed a bi-
level mathematical program to solve the integrated DUESC problem. However, the problem setting was
only for predeﬁned timing plans. The phase sequence and movements were input to the problem and the
decision variable was to choose among one of the ﬁxed timing plans. In addition, in order to represent the
user equilibrium conditions, these models used a cost vector Mt whose value was diﬃcult to determine.
There were only a few papers considering the combined traﬃc assignment and control in dynamic con-
text but they did not completely solve the combined problem. In this study, we ﬁrst explore the properties of
two separate DUE and DSC models before combining them together as the DUESC problem. We develop
a model which possesses the advanced features of them. A combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal
control problem is formulated as the bi-level games (Nash-Cournot and Stackelberg). Then it is solved by
the iterative optimization and assignment (IOA) method.
The contributions of this study include: 1) using a spatial queue based dynamic network loading model
that incorporates both route choice and departure time choice in the integrated DUESC model, 2) handling
the DUESC problem for general multiple O-D networks, 3) considering dynamic sequence and duration of
phases in signal setting, 4) including cycle length constraint and handling all possible turning behaviors to
address all possible phases, 5) formulating the DUESC problem as Nash-Cournot game and Stackelberg
game, and 6) solving the formulation by iterative method and exploring the robustness of the signal control
solution under diﬀerent traﬃc conditions through several numerical experiments.
The list of notations is provided next. Sec. 2 presents the problem deﬁnition and dynamic network
loading models. Sec. 3 demonstrates the separate DUE and DSC formulations as the main components of
the bi-level model. In Sec. 4, the combined DUESC is formulated as a Nash-Cournot and a Stackelberg
games. Sec. 5 develops an IOA heuristic algorithm and discusses its properties. The numerical results are
illustrated in Sec. 6 while the conclusion and future work are discussed in the last section.
Notations used in this paper:
Indices:
w: index for origin-destination pairs
p: index for paths
i: index for cells
(i, j): index for links
t: index for time interval
π: index for intersection
φ: index for phase
Sets:
C: set of cells
CO: set of ordinary cells
CR: set of source cells
CS : set of sink cells
CD: set of diverging cells
CM: set of merging cells
CIS : set of intersection cells
CIM: set of intersection merging cells
E: set of links or cell-connectors
EO: set of ordinary links
ED: set of diverging links
EM: set of merging links
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EIS : set of intersection links
Γ−1i : set of predecessors of cell i
Γi: set of successors of cell i
W: set of all O-D pairs
Pw: set of paths for O-D pair w
P: set of all the paths, P = ∪w∈WPw
Π: set of intersections in the network
Φ: set of phases
R: set of feasible departure rate vectors
Ω: set of feasible signal setting vectors
Parameters:
αw: unit cost of travel time for O-D pair w
βw: unit cost of early arrival for O-D pair w
γw: unit cost of late arrival for O-D pair w, assume βw < αw < γw
t∗w: preferred arrival time for O-D pair w
dw: total demand for O-D pair w
μ: inﬁnitesimal ﬂow to avoid zero denominator
T : maximum departure time
T f : maximum time horizon
Ni: jam density of cell i
Qi: capacity for ﬂow going in and out of cell i
δ: ratio of forward to backward shockwave propagation
Variables:
rp,t: departure rate at time t for the ﬂow using path p
r: vector of departure rate rp,t, r =
(
rp,t
)
p∈P;t=0,··· ,T , r ∈ R
xip,t: cell occupancy of cell i at time t for the ﬂow on path p  i
yi, jp,t: ﬂow from cell i to cell j at time t for the ﬂow on path p  (i, j),
x¯it: aggregate cell occupancy of cell i at time t, i.e., x¯
i
t =
∑
∀p∈P
xip,t, ∀ i ∈ C; t ∈ 0, · · · , T f
y¯i, jt : aggregate ﬂow from cell i to j at time t, i.e., y¯
i, j
t =
∑
∀p∈P
yi, jp,t, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E; t ∈ 0, · · ·T f
x˜i, jt : aggregate cell occupancy at diverging cell i at time t for traﬃc advancing to cell j
TTp,t: travel time for the ﬂow using path p at time t
C∗w: equilibrium cost for users of O-D pair w
νp,t,t′ : auxiliary variable for travel time estimation
ω
π,φ
t : 1 if phase φ ∈ Φ is active at intersection π ∈ Π at time t, 0 otherwise
ω: vector of ωπ,φt , ω =
(
ω
π,φ
t
)
π∈Π;φ∈Φ;t∈0,··· ,T f , ω ∈ Ω
σi, j: Set of phases that allows the movement from i ∈ CIS to j ∈ Γi
κ
i, j
t : 1 if movement from i ∈ CIS to j ∈ Γi is allowed at interval t ∈ 0, · · · , T f , 0 otherwise
νπi : 1 if cell i ∈ CIS belongs to intersection π ∈ Π
2. Problem deﬁnition and dynamic network loading model
We consider multiple O-D traﬃc networks with signalized intersections. Each O-D pair may have
several paths. Cell transmission model is used as the traﬃc ﬂow model. A discrete time model is developed
corresponding to the size of cells, road capacity, and density. There are traﬃc signals at intersections with
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deﬁned phase movements. Each approach includes a phase for left turns and a phase for combined through
movements and right turn. The green time for each phase is a multiple of a time interval. For example, if
time interval is 5s, green time can take value of 5s, 10s, 15s, 20s, etc. The number of paths is predeﬁned
for each O-D. The demand for each O-D is given. Road users at diﬀerent O-D pair w may have diﬀerent
travel time penalty αw, early schedule delay βw, late schedule delay γw, and preferred arrival time t∗w.
We assume that the time horizon (0, · · · , T f ) is large enough so that all vehicles exit the network. The
decision variables are departure rate r and signal control setting ω. The road users minimize their own cost
by choosing appropriate routes and departure time leading to the dynamic user equilibrium behavior. On
the other hand, the signal operator sets a signal control such that the system performance is optimized. It
includes a sequence of phases which is not necessarily in a ﬁxed order and the corresponding green duration
for each phase. The ﬁnal objective is to ﬁnd a traﬃc assignment and a signal setting such that both signal
operator and road users obtain their optimal solutions simultaneously. The ﬁrst constraint for the problem is
the demand satisfaction:
∑
p∈Pw
T∑
t=0
rp,t = dw ∀w ∈ W. (1)
For a given departure rate pattern satisfying the demand, the traﬃc ﬂow is propagated through the net-
work based on a certain dynamic network loading. Dynamic network loading model (DNL) is one of the
most important components of a DTA model. It speciﬁes the way to load and propagate traﬃc throughout
the network. In general, three major categories of DNL models are: 1) Link exit function DNL where traﬃc
is stored at link level without link spill-back phenomenon, 2) Point queue DNL which assumes that all traﬃc
queue up at only one point right before the bottleneck, 3) Spatial queue DNL which can capture the link
spill-back and shockwave propagation. In this paper, we utilize the advantages of the spatial queue DNL in
cell transmission model (CTM) (Daganzo, 1994, 1995) as the underlying traﬃc ﬂow model for the proposed
formulation. Recently, the path-based CTM with special treatment for the merges and the diverges is de-
veloped in Doan and Ukkusuri (2012) and Ukkusuri et al. (2012). This model facilitates DUE computation
since traﬃc at cells/links are disaggregated by paths. The method to distribute ﬂow at merges and diverges
can avoid the use of the exogenous ratios for turning movement as seen in literature (Daganzo, 1995), while
guaranteeing the non-holding-back behavior of real-world traﬃc. In addition, it can be considered as a
simulation-based CTM tool which provides a one-to-one mapping from a departure rate pattern to am entire
traﬃc state. In other words, given a departure rate pattern, which contains all time-dependent path ﬂow, this
DNL will output a unique traﬃc state for the entire network, represented by cell occupancy vector x and
ﬂow vector y. It is especially useful to solve the dynamic user equilibrium with the projection method. The
readers are referred to the work by Ukkusuri et al. (2012) for more details. In the following part, we will
summarize cell occupancy update and ﬂow computation. A new feature is added corresponding to the signal
phasing which allows the traﬃc to advance at the intersections.
Cell update:
xip,0 = 0 ∀i ∈ C; p ∈ P (2)
xip,t = rp,t−1 + x
i
p,t−1 − yi, jp,t−1 ∀i ∈ CR; p  i; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T + 1 (3)
xip,t = x
i
p,t−1 − yi, jp,t−1 ∀i ∈ CR; p  i; j ∈ Γi; t = T + 2, · · · , T f (4)
xip,t = x
i
p,t−1 + y
k,i
p,t−1 − yi, jp,t−1 ∀i ∈ CO; p  i; k ∈ Γ−1i ; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (5)
xip,t = x
i
p,t−1 + y
k,i
p,t−1 − yi, jp,t−1 ∀i ∈ CD ∪CM; p  k, i, j; k ∈ Γ−1i ; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (6)
xip,t = x
i
p,t−1 + y
k,i
p,t−1 ∀i ∈ CS ; p  i; k ∈ Γ−1i ; t = 1, · · · , T f (7)
xip,t = x
i
p,t−1 + y
k,i
p,t−1 − yi, jp,t−1 ∀i ∈ CIS ∪CIM; p  i; k ∈ Γ−1i ; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (8)
Eqn. (2) provides the initial traﬃc conditions. It is also possible to warm up the network by setting
xip,0  0. Eqns. (3) and (4) present the update for source cells which directly recieve ﬂow from departure
rate patterns. Eqns. (5) and (7) update cell occupancy for ordinary cells and sink cells, respectively. Eqn. (6)
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combines cell occupancy update for both diverging and merging cells. We introduce two more cell types:
intersection cell and intersection merging cell to capture the movements at signalized intersections (Eqn.
(8)).
Flow computation: The ﬂow from cells to cells is computed at aggregate and disaggregate levels for four
types of links (or cell connectors) including: ordinary, merging, diverging and intersection links.
y¯i, jt = min
(
x¯it,Q
i,Qj, δ(N j − x¯ jt )
)
∀(i, j) ∈ EO; t = 1, · · · , T (9)
yi, jp,t = y¯
i, j
t ×
xip,t
x¯it + μ
∀(i, j) ∈ EO; p  i; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (10)
x˜i, jt =
∑
∀p(i, j)
xip,t ∀ i ∈ CD; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (11)
y¯i, jt = min(x˜
i, j
t ,Q
j, δ(N j−x¯ jt ))×min
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1,
Qi
∑
j′∈Γi
(
min(x˜i, j
′
t ,Qj
′
, δ(N j′ − x¯ j′t ))
)
+ μ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∀i ∈ CD; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f
(12)
yi, jp,t = y¯
i, j
t ×
xip,t
x˜i, jt + μ
∀ i ∈ CD; p  i; j ∈ Γi; t ∈ 1, · · · , T f (13)
y¯k,it = min(Q
k, x¯kt ) ×min
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1,
min
(
Qi, δ(Ni − x¯it)
)
∑
k′∈Γ−1i
(
min(Qk′ , x¯k′t )
)
+ μ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∀i ∈ CM; k ∈ Γ−1i ; t = 1, · · · , T f (14)
yk,ip,t = y¯
k,i
t ×
xkp,t
x¯kt + μ
∀ i ∈ CM; p  i; k ∈ Γ−1i ; t ∈ 1, · · · , T f (15)
Eqn. (9) computes the aggregate ﬂow at ordinary links. Then, the ﬂow is disaggregated by paths using
Eqn. (10). Eqns. (11) and (12) determine aggregate ﬂow for diverging links in which the turning ratio is
determined by the demand and supply at upstream and downstream cells. Eqn. (13) disaggregates ﬂow
by paths for each diverging link. Similarly, Eqns. (14) and (15) deﬁne the aggregate ﬂow and path ﬂow,
respectively, for the merging links.
In a four-legged intersection (Fig. 4), the traﬃc from diﬀerent intersection cells can advance to an
intersection merging cell (the ﬁrst cell on the next link). Due to signal control, there will not be any merging
of traﬃc into this intersection merging cell. For instance, the left turn movement (from cell 105) and the
straight-through movement (from cell 108) do not come to cell 44 at the same time interval. Therefore, the
intersection merging cell, along with the signal control restriction, behaves as the ordinary cell with only one
predecessor and one successor. An inﬂow control variable κi, jt is introduced to implement the signal control.
κ
i, j
t can have 0-1 values (1 when movements from cell i ∈ CIS to cell j ∈ CIM is allowed; 0 otherwise). Then
the aggregate ﬂow at intersection is computed:
y¯i, jt = min
(
x¯it,Q
i, κ
i, j
t Q
j, δ(N j − x¯ jt )
)
∀i ∈ CIS ; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (16)
If κi, jt = 1, signal for movement (i, j) is green and allow maximum κ
i, j
t Q
j going through intersection. If κi, jt
= 0, traﬃc need to stay in cell i until green. Then, the proportional rule is applied to obtain the path ﬂow:
yi, jp,t = min
(
x¯it,Q
i, κ
i, j
t Q
j, δ(N j − x¯ jt )
)
× x
i
p,t
x¯it + μ
∀i ∈ CIS ; j ∈ Γi; p  i; t = 1, · · · , T f (17)
This DNL model is crucial in our paper since it will be used in both DUE and DSO models which will
be discussed below.
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3. Dynamic user equilibrium and signal control
We are now ready to present the separate formulations for dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) and dynamic
signal control (DSC) based on the above dynamic network loading model.
3.1. Dynamic User Equilibrium
The dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) model in this work considers both route choice and departure time
choice features. It is required to compute the travel time and then total cost for the ﬂow of each path at each
departure time interval. In this paper, we adopt the average travel time computation method (Ramadurai,
2009; Han et al., 2011; Ukkusuri et al., 2012) because it can accurately determine the actual travel time for
the traﬃc ﬂow. Although the average travel time leads to the non-linear constraints which increase the model
complexity, it can be computed as eﬃciently as the maximum travel time model since we use the heuristic
projection algorithm proposed by Ukkusuri et al. (2012). The formulation to compute average travel time is
described as follows:
νp,t,t′ = max
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝0,
t∑
h=0
rp,h − xsp,t′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∀p ∈ P; s ∈ p ∩CS ; t = 0, · · · , T ; t′ = t, · · · , T f
(18)
TTp,0 =
T f−1∑
h=0
(νp,0,h − νp,0,h+1)h
rp,0 + μ
∀p ∈ P
(19)
TTp,t =
T f−1∑
h=t
(νp,t,h − νp,t,h+1 + νp,t−1,h+1 − νp,t−1,h)(h − t)
rp,t + μ
∀p ∈ P; s ∈ p ∩CS ; t = 0, · · · , T
(20)
The max operator can be replaced by the following complementarity constraint:
0 ≤ νp,t,t′ ⊥ νp,t,t′ −
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
t∑
h=0
rp,h − xsp,t′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P; t = 0, · · · , T ; t′ = t, · · · , T f (21)
The details on average travel time computation can be found in Han et al. (2011) and are not repeated
here. After travel time is computed, it is easy to determine the early and late schedule delays for the
departures of each path at each time interval. Then, the dynamic equilibrium can be formulated by using
the complementarity formulation which guarantees dynamic user equilibrium conditions (Han et al., 2011;
Ukkusuri et al., 2012).
0 ≤ rp,t ⊥ αwTTp,t + βwep,t + γw
(
ep,t −
(
t∗w − t − TTp,t
))
−C∗w ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ W; p ∈ Pw; t ∈ 0, · · · , T f (22)
0 ≤ ep,t ⊥ ep,t −
(
t∗w − t − TTp,t
)
≥ 0 ∀w ∈ W; p ∈ Pw; t ∈ 0, · · · , T f (23)
0 ≤ C∗w ⊥
∑
p∈Pw
T∑
t=0
rp,t − dw ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ W (24)
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In Eqn. (22), TTp,t, ep,t, and (ep,t − (t∗w − t − TTp,t)) are travel time, early arrival time, and late arrival
time, respectively, for traﬃc taking path p and departing at time interval t. Constraint (23) shows that the
traﬃc departing at time t of path p either pay early or late penalty. Constraint (24) represents the demand
satisfaction condition.
The overall formulation for dynamic user equilibrium with signalized intersection includes:
• Demand preservation (1),
• Dynamic network loading (2)-(17),
• Travel time computation (18)-(20),
• Dynamic equilibrium (22)-(24).
The DUE framework above is to solve the dynamic user equilibrium with a ﬁxed signal setting. This
problem can be solved eﬃciently by using the projection algorithm (Ukkusuri et al., 2012). The diﬀerence
in this model is the introduction of intersection cells and links with ﬁxed signal control schemes. However,
it does not aﬀect the solution existence and solution method from the original model.
3.2. Dynamic Signal Control
The dynamic signal control is formulated as a system optimal model to minimize the total system travel
time. Based on the DNL model, the signal control optimization contains an objective function and a set of
signal control constraints. The objective function minimizes the total travel time experienced by all road
users:
minimize G(ω) =
∑
p∈P
∑
∀t
∑
i∈C\CS
xip,t (25)
In Eqn. (25), xip,t is a function of given departure rate r and signal settingω based on the embedded DNL
(2)-(17). The duration of an time interval τ can be added to each xip,t. However, it does not aﬀect the result
of the optimization problem. Hence τ is ignored in Eqn. 25. The signal control part contains the constraints
for phasing, maximum and minimum green time:
∑
φ∈Φ
ω
π,φ
t = 1 ∀π ∈ Π; t ∈ 1, · · · , T f (26)
κ
i, j
t =
∑
φ∈σi, j
ω
π,φ
t × νπi ∀π ∈ Π ∀i ∈ CIS ; j ∈ Γi;σi, j ⊂ Φ; t ∈ 1, · · · , T f (27)
tˆ∑
t=tˆ−Gmax
ω
π,φ
t ≤ Gmax ∀π ∈ Π; φ ∈ Φ; tˆ ∈ {Gmax,Gmax + 1,Gmax + 2, . . . ,T f } (28)
ω
π,φ
Gmintˆ
= ω
π,φ
Gmintˆ−1 = ω
π,φ
Gmintˆ−2 = · · · = ω
π,φ
Gmintˆ−Gmin+1 ∀π ∈ Π; φ ∈ Φ; tˆ ∈ 1, 2, · · · , T f /Gmin (29)
tˆ∑
t=tˆ−Θmax
ω
π,φ
t ≥ 1 ∀π ∈ Π; φ ∈ Φ; tˆ ∈ {Θmax,Θmax + 1,Θmax + 2, . . . ,T f } (30)
Eqn. (26) indicates that no more than a single phase (for an intersection in the network) is activated at any
time interval. Eqn. (27) constructs a mapping between the ﬂow propagation and control in the simulation.
At any time interval, only the decision variables (ωπ,φt ) corresponding to phases allowing movement from
i ∈ CIS to j ∈ CIM are summed to obtain the indicator whether movement from i ∈ CIS to j ∈ CIM is
possible. Since the decision variables are binary and only one phase can be activated at any time step, κi, jt
can only be 0 or 1. Another indicator νπi is used to ensure the connection of each intersection cell and the
intersection. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that maximum green is an integer multiple of one
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time interval. Further, Gmax is an integer deﬁned as the total number of time steps in the maximum green.
For example, if the maximum green time is 40 seconds and the time interval is ﬁve seconds then Gmax will
be eight. The set containing tˆ will be {8, 9, . . . ,T f }. When tˆ = 12, then equation (28) holds. Constraint
(29) ensures that each phase in the timing plan must have at least the duration of minimum green deﬁned
by the signal operator. For instance, if the minimum green duration is 20 seconds and each time interval
is 5 seconds, Gmin will be four. Now, the set containing tˆ will be 1, 2, 3, . . . ,T f /4. Eqn. (29) ensures that
when any phase is activated, it must be activated for at least successive four steps. Eqn. (30) ensures that
each phase in the timing plan is activated at least once within the maximum cycle length allowed. The
parameter Θmax denotes the maximum cycle length as a multiple of simulation time steps. For example,
if the maximum cycle length allowed is 120 seconds and the time step is 5 seconds, then Θmax will be 24.
Again, if any phase is activated it will remain activated for at least Gmin steps, as explained in equation (29).
The overall formulation for dynamic signal control problem includes:
• Objective function (25),
• Signal control constraints (26)-(30)
• Dynamic network loading (2)-(17).
There are two factors which make this DSC model complex: 1) integer variables of signal setting,
2) non-linear form in simulation-based DNL model. Therefore, the relaxation of CTM DNL with linear
programming (LP) formulation (Ziliaskopoulos, 2000) is used instead. The strict equality constraints in
Eqn. (9)-(17) are replaced by thhe inequality constraints to compute ﬂow yi, jp,t:
yi, jp,t ≤ xip,t ∀p ∈ P; i ∈ C\CS ; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (31)∑
p∈P
yi, jp,t ≤ Qi ∀i ∈ C\CS ; j ∈ Γi; t = 1, · · · , T f (32)
∑
p∈P
yi, jp,t ≤ Qj ∀ j ∈ C\{CIM ∪CR}; i ∈ Γ−1i ; t = 1, · · · , T f (33)
∑
p∈P
yi, jp,t ≤ δ(N j − x¯ jt ) ∀ j ∈ C\CR; i ∈ Γ−1i ; t = 1, · · · , T f (34)
∑
j∈Γi
y¯i, jt ≤ Qi ∀i ∈ CD; t = 1, · · · , T f (35)
∑
i∈Γ−1j
y¯i, jt ≤ Qj ∀ j ∈ CM; t = 1, · · · , T f (36)
∑
p∈P
yi, jp,t = y¯
i, j
t ∀(i, j) ∈ E; t = 1, · · · , T f (37)
∑
p∈P
yi, jp,t ≤ κi, jt × Qj ∀ j ∈ CIM; i ∈ Γ−1i ; t = 1, · · · , T f (38)
T∑
t=0
rp,t ≤
T f∑
t=0
yi,sp,t ∀p ∈ P; s ∈ CS ∩ p; i ∈ Γ−1s (39)
Eqn. (31) shows that the ﬂow of path p from i to j at time t cannot exceed the actual cell occupancy xip,t.
Eqn. (32)-(34) guarantee that the aggregate ﬂow is constrained by the capacity of upstream/downstream
cells and the remaining space at downstream cell. Eqns. (35)-(37) consider the ﬂow proportion at diverges
and merges. They make sure that total ﬂow going out of a diverging cell is limited by the capacity of the
diverging cell (35), and the total ﬂow going into a merging cell is limited by the capacity of the merging cell
(36). Eqn. (38) describes the ﬂow at intersection. They are constrained by the signal setting κi, jt which can
take a value of zero or one. Eqn. (39) makes sure that all ﬂow reaches the destination. A dynamic signal
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control (DSC) formulation based on a mixed integer programming approach was formulated in Aziz and
Ukkusuri (2012).
The solution of the linearized CTM may possess the holding-back issue in which some traﬃc artiﬁcially
hold back instead of advance forward. However, it does not inﬂuence the objective of the system optimal.
Notice that, if the holding-back occurs in the DUE solution, it will aﬀect the individual costs. It is shown in
literature that, in the system optimal condition, there is always a solution without holding-back, which leads
to the same objective values (Shen et al., 2007; Zhu and Ukkusuri, 2012). Thus holding-back is not an issue
when we solve the DSC problem with the linearized cell transmission model.
4. DUESC formulated as a Nash-Cournot game and a Stackelberg game
In this section, we develop a combined formulation taking into account both user equilibrium and signal
control optimization. The problem can be formulated as a game between two players: traﬃc signal operator
and group of road users. Both players maximize their utilities by rationally making their decisions. Par-
ticularly, the signal operator provides an appropriate signal setting to minimize the total system travel time
while the road users select paths and departure time to minimize their own costs. Based on the information
assumptions, i.e. whether a player knows about the other player’s strategy as well as playing order of two
players, the combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal control can be formulated as a Nash-Cournot
game or a Stackelberg game.
4.1. DUESC formulated as a Nash-Cournot game
In the static Nash-Cournot game, two players simultaneously make their decisions (ω∗ for signal oper-
ator and r∗ for road users) to minimize their costs without any knowledge about the other player’s perfor-
mance function. In this game, no player announces and imposes his/her strategy to the other. The signal
operator wants to minimize the total system cost while taking into account that road users may change their
routes or departure time. On the other hand, the road users want to obtain minimum cost while consider-
ing that the signal setting may be changed by the signal operator. Notice that, this information structure
is diﬀerent from that of the Stackelberg game in which one player’s strategy depends on the other player’s
announced strategy. At Nash equilibrium, no player is better oﬀ by unilaterally changing their decisions.
Particularly, if the signal operator changes the signal setting while the path ﬂow pattern of road users is
unchanged, the total system cost will increase or at least be equal to the previous cost. On the other hand,
if the road users change their path ﬂow pattern while the signal setting is kept the same, they may not be in
equilibrium or some of them may pay higher cost. This Nash-Cournot game can be formulated as a bi-level
game. It is possible that (a) player 1 is at upper level and player 2 at the lower level, or (b) player 2 is at
upper level and player 1 is at lower level.
We ﬁrst formulate (a). Let R be the feasible set of departure rate r which captures both route choice and
departure time choice of the road users. Let ω be the vector of signal control setting which belongs to set
Ω. The traﬃc signal operator optimizes the total system travel time by minimizing DSC objective function
G(ω, r) subjected to the signal control constraints. Let F be the cost function corresponding to each r for a
given ω, i.e. c = F(r,ω), based on a certain dynamic network loading model and cost computation. Then
the dynamic user equilibrium can be formulated as a variational inequality system VI(R, F) where all road
users minimize their own costs. Fig. 1(a) shows the combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal control
formulated as a Nash-Cournot game. In this game, two players have only one step to simultaneously choose
their best decisions. The total number of outcomes is determined by all combinations of both players’
decisions (|r| × |ω|). The number of feasible signal control decision Ω is ﬁnite. However, the departure rate
set R is inﬁnite due to the assumption of non-atomic traﬃc ﬂow. The goal is to ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium
solution in which no player has an incentive to change his/her decision unilaterally.
Fig. 1(b) illustrates the case in which player 2 (group of road users) is at upper level and player 1
(signal operator) is at lower level. This formulation is conceptually similar to formulation (a) in Fig. 1.
The purpose is to optimize the objectives of both players. No player has any advantage over the other.
Compared to formulation (a) which can be categorized as an MPEC problem (mathematical programming
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with equilibrium constraints), formulation (b) does not have a closed form and it has not been studied
theoretically yet. However, a heuristic algorithm to solve these Nash-Cournot games can be developed. We
will continue the algorithm discussion after formulating the DUESC problem as a Stackelberg game.
Min  ( , )
Subject to:
G r
Z
Z Upper level
     g( , ) 0: Traffic signal control constraints
     SOL( , )F
d

r
r R
Z
Lower level
(a)
          Where  is feasible region of ,  and
           maps  and  to cost  through DNLF
r
R r
r cZ
Solve VI( , )
S bj t t
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      is feasible region of ,  and
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R r
r cZ
         
              
     Min  ( , )
S bj t t
G r
Z
Z Lower level
(b)
     u ec  o:
          g( , ) 0: Traffic signal control constraintsdrZ
Fig. 1. DUESC problem formulated as Nash-Cournot games
4.2. DUESC formulated as a Stackelberg game
This section describes the DUESC problem formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the signal control
operator is the leader while the group of users is the follower. It is assumed that the follower always
optimizes her utility based on the decision announced and played by the leader, and the leader knows how
the follower will respond to any decision he/she may play. This assumption makes the Stackelberg game
diﬀerent from the Nash-Cournot game where no player has advantages over the other. At the lower level,
the road users always respond to the signal setting made by the signal operator to reach an equilibrium
condition. At the upper level, the signal operator knows how the road users react to his/her decision. Hence
he/she can customize the signal setting to obtain the best total system cost. The leader is usually better oﬀ
in the Stackelberg game than in the Nash game since he/she can impose his/her strategy to inﬂuence the
decision made by the follower. Fig. 2 illustrates the bi-level model formulated as a Stackelberg game.
Min ( , ( ))
Subject to:
G
Ȧ
rZ Z Upper level
     g( , ( )) 0 : Traffic signal control constraints
    
drZ Z
  ( ) SOL ( ), Fr RZ Z Lower level
      Where ( ) is feasible region of ( ),  and
maps and a given to cost through DNLF
r
R r
r c
Z Z
Z                 
Fig. 2. DUESC problem formulated as a Stackelberg game
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In the upper level, signal setting ω is the decision variable. G(ω, r(ω)) is the function of total travel cost
in Eqn. (25) and r(ω) is the rational response of the road users to a given signal setting ω. This response
is taken into account in the objective function, hence the leader has more opportunity to obtain better cost
than the cost he/she can obtain from the Nash-Cournot game. Notice that the objective function implicitly
includes the dynamic network loading because variable x in Eqn. (25) is computed based on certain dynamic
network loading model. g(ω, r(ω)) ≤ 0 is the set of signal control constraints which include phasing, timing,
and max and min green time.
In the lower level, r(ω) is a solution of VI(R(ω), F) for a given ω. r(ω) can be considered as a rational
response of the follower based on a given decision ω played by the leader. Then SOL(R(ω), F) is the
rational reaction set of departure rate r corresponding to signal setting ω. R(ω) is the set of feasible solution
r corresponding to certain ω. In fact, this feasible region is always a polyhedron constrained by the total
demand preservation (1) and independent of signal setting ω. Thus R(ω) is equivalent to R ∀ω. F is the
cost function that map departure rate r and given signal setting ω to cost vector c. The cost is computed
based on DNL (2)-(17) and travel time computation constraints (18)-(20). Since SOL(R(ω), F) is not empty
(Ukkusuri et al., 2012), we can avoid the situation where the bi-level in Fig. 2 is not well posted (Bard,
1998).
The pair (ω∗, r∗) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if and only if 1) the follower has no incentive to shift their
decisions because it is the best solution based on ω∗, and 2) the leader has no incentive to deviate from ω∗
because if he/she does so, the follower will change their decision as well, which makes the leader worst-oﬀ.
In other words, (ω∗, r∗) is a Stackelberg solution if and only if neither signal operator nor group of road
users has an incentive to deviate from condition (ω∗, r∗) in the context that the follower always responds
based on leader’s decision and the leader know in advance the follower’s strategy .
Formulating the DUESC problem as Stackelberg game is appropriate when the road users can only
optimize their cost based on a given decision made by the signal operator who has prior knowledge about
road users’ response. Although Stackelberg game is a valid framework for the DUESC problem, it is diﬃcult
to solve this Stackelberg game because r(ω) is a decision variable in both objective function and VI problem.
In addition, one may face a diﬃculty to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium if SOL(R(ω), F) is not single-
valued. In fact, the cost function F is not convex. Thus the follower may have multiple optimal solution
r∗(ω). Hence, in the Stackelberg game, the leader may not be able to optimize her utility if the follower
randomly selects a strategy which may make the leader worst-oﬀ (Bard, 1998).
5. Heuristic algorithm to solve DUESC problem
The DUESC problem can be conceptually formulated as two static games above. The diﬀerence be-
tween two games is the assumptions in the information structure. In Nash-Cournot game, no player known
the other player’s strategy in advance while in Stackelberg game, the leader has more advantage when an-
nouncing his/her decision and realize the reaction of the follower in order to better choose the ﬁnal decision.
In real world implementation, it is not feasible to get an exact solution after only one-step game. It is due to
the fact that the traﬃc condition can signiﬁcantly vary among diﬀerent scenarios and the results from new
signal setting will not be validated until the traﬃc stabilizes at equilibrium condition. In this section, we
propose a heuristic algorithm based on the iterative optimization and assignment (IOA) procedure to obtain
the mutual consistency between two consecutive solutions.
5.1. Iterative Optimization and Assignment algorithm
This algorithm breaks down the intractable problem into two solvable modules: dynamic signal control
module with given departure rate pattern, and dynamic user equilibrium with given signal setting. This
algorithm includes multiple stages in which each player’s decision is based on the other player’s decision in
the previous step. With this property, the output from this heuristic algorithm is more likely Nash-Cournot
equilibrium than Stackelberg equilibrium since no player has any advantage over the other. It is possible to
start the algorithm by either signal control’s or road users’ decision. If the algorithm converges, the expected
optimal solution possesses the properties such that no player has any incentive to deviate unilaterally from
his/her optimal strategy, which is equivalent to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution.
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Fig. 3. Heuristic algorithm to solve DUESC
Fig. 3 shows the heuristic algorithm to solve the DUESC problem. The lower level includes path-based
DNL in Eqns. (2)-(17), travel time computation Eqns. (18)-(20), and dynamic equilibrium Eqns. (22)-(24).
The aforementioned DNL can capture very detailed traﬃc dynamics although it contains the non-linear
constraints. The DUE problem with path-based CTM can be solved by the projection algorithm (Ukkusuri
et al., 2012) with a given signal setting.
When separated from the DUE module, the upper level is a mixed integer formulation with an explicit
DNL model. Since the signal control module consists of integer variables, we reduce the complexity of the
DNL so that the upper level can be solved eﬃciently. Then, the relaxed path-based CTM with linearized
structure extended from the (Ziliaskopoulos, 2000) is embedded as the underlying traﬃc ﬂow model. It
facilitates the exact solution method by using MIP solvers. In addition to the signal control constraint set
(26)-(30) and the cell occupancy update (2)-(8), the linear DNL is added by Eqn. (31)-(35)
The entire formulation for upper level DSC includes Eqns. (25), (26)-(30), (31)-(35). The linearized
CTM has a nice structure which can be easily embedded into optimization problems. In addition, the values
of cell occupancy x and ﬂow y is determined by the objective function rather than a simulation procedure. In
other words, with objective function, there is no strict rule to deﬁne how much ﬂow to be sent forward. The
ﬂow can take an arbitrary value as long as it satisﬁes (31)-(35). Then the objective function will optimize
those values. Formulating the DNL as a set of linear constraints facilitates the solution process for the upper
level as mixed integer linear program (MILP). It can be solved eﬃciently by the state-of-the-art solvers such
as CPLEX, Gurobi, MINTO, etc. In this paper, we use CPLEX to iteratively solve the MILP for the upper
level problem.
In this heuristic algorithm, we start with a feasible solution of the upper level DSC problem. However,
without loss of generality, one can start with a feasible solution of the lower level DUE. The convergence
criteria can be considered as the mutual consistence between the two consecutive solutions in both signal
setting and dynamic user equilibrium modules. As long as the mutual consistence is obtained, the algorithm
stops. Otherwise, it continues until the convergence criterion is satisﬁed. The heuristic algorithm in Fig. 3
can be elaborated in details as follows:
Solution algorithm:
• Step 0: Initialization. Set iteration index n := 0. Choose a feasible departure rate r0
• Step 1: n := n + 1. Solve the upper level using MIP to obtain signal setting ωn based on given
departure rate rn−1
• Step 2: Given signal setting obtained from step 1, solve the lower level VI(R, F) using projection
algorithm to ﬁnd DUE vector rn
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• Step 3: Convergence test. Check if |rn| − |rn−1| ≤ , then stop. Otherwise go to step 1 for another
iteration.
5.2. Solution existence for heuristic IOA algorithm to solve DUESC
The DUE module in this paper is slightly diﬀerence from that in Ukkusuri et al. (2012) due to the signal
setting at intersections. The general structure of the DUE such as travel time computation and dynamic
equilibrium are similar to the cited paper. Therefore, we can show the solution existence for the DUE
module in this paper by using the same technique in Ukkusuri et al. (2012). Particularly, we can show that
VI(R, F) is deﬁned on a nonempty compact and convex set R. In addition, the cost function F is continuous
in r. Thus, by (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Corollary 2.2.5), the solution set of VI(R, F) is nonempty and
compact Then the DUE formulation always exists a solution.
The upper level is to solve a mixed integer linear programming ω with a given departure rate pattern
r. In this section, we provide the condition that guarantees the solution existence for the signal control
formulation. First of all, it is easy to see that the objective function (25) is bounded below by zero. Then,
if the MILP is feasible, the solution will be bounded. Second, we’ve found that the feasibility is satisﬁed if
the time horizon T f is big enough so that all vehicle can reach destination. Given r from the lower level, for
any signal setting ω, the objective function always try to send all ﬂow to destinations as soon as possible in
order to minimize the total cost. Provided that T f is suﬃciently large, ω will be a feasible solution for the
upper level. In addition, since the set of feasible signal settingsΩ is ﬁnite, we can conﬁrm that there always
exists a solution for the DSC problem as long as the time horizon is big enough.
Although we can prove the solution existence for both upper and lower levels, there is no conclusion yet
on the uniqueness of the solution. The upper level problem is linear but the decision variables are integral.
In the lower level, the feasible region is a polyhedron but the cost function is non-convex. Hence a solution
from either upper or lower level is only local. Fisk (1984) showed that the iterative algorithm converges to
a global solution if the coeﬃcient matrix is strictly diagonally dominant. The dynamic model in this paper
does not have this nice property. Therefore we cannot ensure that the algorithm can converge to a global
solution. The stopping criterion only guarantees that both players, including traﬃc operator and group of
road users, do not have any incentive to unilaterally changes their decision within a small perturbation value
λ. Hence the local optimal point is obtained. In the next section, we will provide a numerical experiment to
evaluate the beneﬁt of using the proposed formulation and algorithm.
6. Numerical results
6.1. Solving DUESC for network with isolated signalized intersection
Fig. 4 shows the cell representation of the ﬁrst test network. There are four O-D pairs. O-D 1-12
contains three paths: path one goes straight through the intersection, path two turns left at the intersection,
and path three bypasses the intersection. Other O-D pairs are 21-29, 31-36, and 41-46. The test network
is based on CTM representation. Each time interval is equivalent to 10s. The demand is ﬁxed for each
O-D. Users are heterogenous by O-Ds, which means that group of users from diﬀerent O-Ds have diﬀerent
preferred arrival time, travel time penalty, and delay penalty, while the users in the same O-D have similar
penalty values. The general idea for solving the problem is as follows. First, signal timing and phasing is
determined to minimize total cost. Second, road users adapt to the signal by choosing routes and departure
times to minimize their own cost. We use the proposed heuristic algorithm to solve the bi-level problem
iteratively.
At convergence, the DUE solutions are presented in Fig. 5-7. The blue line represents the departure rate
pattern while the red line represents the corresponding cost pattern. For O-D 1-12, majority of the users
choose path 1 which going through the intersection, and some of them use path 2 to bypass the intersection.
In the other three O-Ds, the users choose appropriate departure time where they incur the low cost. In
those ﬁgures, the route and departure time chosen lead to the low individual costs although the costs are not
minimal and equal as in the exact analytical DUE solution.
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Fig. 4. Test network with isolated signalized intersection
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Fig. 5. Departure rate pattern and corresponding cost for O-D 1-12
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Fig. 7. Departure rate pattern and corresponding cost for O-D 31-36
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Phase1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Phase2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Phase3 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Phase4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Time 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Phase1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Phase2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Phase3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Phase4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Fig. 8. Solution for signal setting
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Fig. 9. Convergence of the algorithm for the test network
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Fig. 8 shows the corresponding signal timing for the intersection. The cycle length varies to better serve
the given demand pattern. For example, the ﬁrst cycle is in time interval 1-5. The second one is from time 6
to 11. In this cycle, phase 2 is not activated while phase 4 includes four time intervals. The maximum green
time is equal to 8 time intervals and is set for phase 3 at time 20-27 and phase 1 at 28-35. The proposed
signal setting assume 10s for minimum green and loss time due to yellow or all-red is ignored. Fig. 9a
illustrates the convergence of the algorithm in terms of total system travel time of the entire network. The
DUE cost decreases and the DSC cost increases over iterations and they converge to the same value after
9 iterations. Fig. 9b is transformed from Fig. 9a to show the diﬀerence of total system travel time from
optimal values.
The solution from Figs. 5-9 may not necessarily be a global solution as discussed in Sec. 5.2. However,
it is a mutual consistence between optimal signal setting and user equilibrium. Hence a small perturbation of
signal setting or departure rate does not change the solution. In other words, if the convergence is obtained,
we can guarantee that the solution is at least a local solution.
6.2. Sensitivity analysis
This section tests the stability of the ﬁnal signal setting with respect to slightly perturbed demand pat-
terns. The proposed formulation considers deterministic demand and we assume an ideal condition in which
road users and signal setting behave exactly as in the solution. In fact, the demand follows the stochastic
nature and may vary around the equilibrium assignment. In order to see whether the optimal signal setting
and user equilibrium are robust or not, we ﬁx the optimal signal setting and vary the ﬂow patterns before
comparing the total objective value with the base case which is the solution of DUESC. We test three sets
of scenarios. In the ﬁrst one, the departure rate pattern is randomly varied within a certain amount σ%. It
means that each value rp,t now can take arbitrary value within [(1 −σ)rp,t, (1 +σ)rp,t]. In this case, the total
demand may also vary. In the second test series, the departure rate pattern varies within a certain amount σ%
such that the total demand is ﬁxed. In the third test, the total demand changes as well as the the departure
rate patterns within a certain amount σ% as in the previous tests. By varying the departure rate patterns, we
test how the small perturbations in the departure pattern aﬀect the congestion levels and route choice with
the given signal setting.
6.2.1. Test 1: Demand Perturbation
In the ﬁrst sets of scenarios, we test how well the optimal signal performs when the departure rate
randomly varies within ten, twenty and thirty percent of the equilibrium values. For each category, we
generate hundred samples of random departure rate patterns which varies within certain percent σ of the
base case: rp,t = rp,t(1 ± σ%) ∀p ∈ P; t ∈ 0, · · · , T ;σ ≤ σ ≤ σ¯. Each departure rate pattern, along with
the given optimal signal setting, is sent to the DNL to solve the traﬃc propagation and compute the system
travel time (STT ) and the system travel time per traﬃc demand (STT = STT/
∑
p,t rp,t). Then each STT is
compared with STT
∗
in the optimal solution. The diﬀerence is reported as percentage change over the base
case. After collecting hundred values, we use the frequency plot to show the distribution of total travel time
per traﬃc demand around the base case. Fig. 10 shows the results for three sets of scenarios corresponding
to ten, twenty and thirty percent of variation. For example, in Fig. 10a, the highest column tells us that,
in one hundred samples when all departure rate value rp,t randomly varies within ten percent, there are 38
times that the system travel time per traﬃc unit STT is from −1% to 0% lower than the base case. Hence
Fig. 10a shows that the diﬀerence in system travel time per traﬃc unit STT is less than 3% and greater
than −2% corresponding to ten percent of departure rate variation. Similarly, Fig. 10b and Fig. 10c show
the frequency plots corresponding to twenty and thirty percent of departure rate variation. The absolute
variation of system travel time per traﬃc unit STT is less than 5% and 7% for twenty and thirty percent
of departure rate variation. This observation demonstrates the robustness of the DUESC optimal solution
because the ﬁnal signal control scheme is robust to diﬀerent variation of departure rate patterns.
6.2.2. Test II: Fixed Demand with Perturbed Departure Rate
In the previous scenarios, there may be more or less traﬃc loaded into the network. Then the total
demand changes arbitrarily. In this section, we test how the signal control performs when the O-D demand
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Fig. 10. Total-cost comparisons with base case for diﬀerent departure rate variations
is ﬁxed but the users shift their departure time choice and route choice. Similarly to previous section, we
consider three categories of ten, twenty, and thirty percent of maximize departure rate variation ([σ, σ¯] =
[−30%, 30%], [−20%, 20%], [−10%, 10%]). For each category, given the user equilibrium solution from
Sec. 6.1, we generate a hundred samples of random departure rate patterns which varies within certain
percent σ of the base case: rp,t = rp,t(1 ± σ%) ∀p ∈ P; t ∈ 0, · · · , T ;σ ≤ σ ≤ σ¯. The new total demand
for each path of each O-D pair is computed d′w. Then each new departure rate r′p,t is normalized by dw/d′w.
Hence, the new arbitrary departure rate pattern will has the same total demand for each O-D. Now we
conduct the same test as in the previous section and the results are presented in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11a shows that if the departure rate pattern varies within 10% of the magnitude such that total O-D
demand is unchanged, 46 samples over 100 have less traﬃc congestion and the system travel time per traﬃc
unit is within 1% of that in equilibrium solution. The other 54 samples over 100 have more traﬃc congestion
and the system travel time per traﬃc unit is within 1% of that in equilibrium solution. Even in the cases
that departure rate pattern varies within 30% in Fig. 11c, the variation in congestion level is less than 3%. It
shows the robustness of the optimal signal setting when the O-D demand is ﬁxed and road users may change
departure time and route choice based on the equilibrium solution.
6.2.3. Test III: Simultaneous Demand and Departure Rate Perturbation
In this section, the objective is to see how well the signal setting is designed when the demand is lower
or higher than the base case. We conduct a series of tests which are similar to the one in Sec. 6.2.2
except the diﬀerent values of O-D demand. Fig. 12 shows the tests when total demand is perturbed by
0.9, 0.95, 1.05, 1.1 times the demand in base case. Departure rate pattern is varied within ten, twenty and
thirty percent. As the results, for 90% of total demand, there is about 6% of reduction in system travel time
per traﬃc unit. There is about 3% decrease in system travel time per traﬃc unit when 95% of demand is
considered. On the other hand, when there is 5% increase in total demand, the total system travel time per
traﬃc unit is about 3% higher than the base case. If 10% of demand is added, there is average 7% more
in system travel time per traﬃc unit. These results show that the change in demand level cause little eﬀect
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Fig. 11. Total-cost comparisons with base case in ﬁxed demand scenarios
in congestion level of the entire system. Therefore, the solution of the DUESC problem is robust for both
signal setting and user equilibrium conditions.
6.3. Solving DUESC for network with multiple signalized intersections
In this section, we test how the algorithm can be used to solve the DUESC problem for a bigger network
with multiple signalized intersections. Fig. 13 shows the cell-based test network with multiple intersections.
There are two more O-D pairs corresponding to the additional intersection. Other conﬁgurations are kept
similar to the previous test network. Figs. 14-15 show approximate equilibrium assignment at convergence
for some OD pairs while Fig. 16 presents the optimal signal setting. The results illustrate the use of the
formulation and algorithm for multiple intersection networks. However, note that we do not model the
synchronization of intersections in this model. The formulation can possibly be extended to this case by
additional constraints in the upper level problem.
7. Conclusion and future work
This paper proposes the combined formulations of dynamic traﬃc assignment and signal control as bi-
level games. A realistic spatial queue DNL based on extended CTM is embeded, which can capture the
spatial traﬃc phenomena such as link spill-back and shockwave propagation in multiple O-D networks. The
model considers not only route choice but also departure time choice in the user equilibrium module. The
signal control module contains the properties such as dynamic sequence and duration of phases in signal
setting. The dynamic user equilibrium and dynamic system optimal formulations are studied as a foundation
for the combined DUESC models. Then we formulate the DUESC problem as a Nash-Cournot game and
a Stackelberg game. The properties and validity of each model are discussed in details. Solving the exact
Nash-Cournot game and Stackelberg game by analytical approaches is very diﬃcult. Hence a heuristic
procedure based on iterative optimization and assignment (IOA) method is developed. In this algorithm, we
separate the upper and lower levels and iteratively solve them using MIP solvers and projection algorithm,
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Fig. 12. Network performance with variability of total demand
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Fig. 13. Test network with multiple signalized intersections
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Fig. 14. Departure rate pattern and corresponding cost for O-D 1-16, 21-34, and 41-46
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Intersection1
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Phase1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Phase2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Phase3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Phase4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Time 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Phase1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Phase2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Phase3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Phase4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intersection2
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Phase1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Phase2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Phase3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Phase4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Time 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Phase1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Phase2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Phase3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Phase4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Fig. 16. Solution for signal setting
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respectively. By using the proposed algorithm, this paper conducts series of experiments to solve the test
networks and obtain insights into the solution procedure. The sensitivity analysis conﬁrms the robustness of
the optimal solution obtained from the heuristic algorithm.
In the near future, we are planning to discover the applicability of more eﬃcient dynamic network
loading models in order to reduce the complexity when solving large scale DUESC problems. Although cell
transmission model can replicate the real world traﬃc condition, it is computationally expensive especially
at ﬁner time discretizations. Second, eﬃcient algorithms can be utilized to solve the upper level problem.
For instance a branch and price algorithm may be used to solve the MIP formulation eﬀectively within
the IOA method. Then we can focus on developing another heuristic procedures for solving the DUESC
problem formulated as bi-level games.
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